Work

Peer Reviewed Books and Articles:

Forthcoming at PSL Quarterly:

Institutions, Liquidity Preference, and Reserve Asset Holding in the Eurozone Core and Periphery Before and After Crises,” forthcoming in December 2022

Forthcoming at Journal of Economic Issues:

German Public Banks, Financial Competition, and Crisis: Institutional Change in German Banking and Financial Vulnerability Before the Global Financial Crisis,” forthcoming in 2023

Financial Underpinnings of the European Crisis: Financial Deregulation, Privatization, and Asymmetric State Power; Edgar Elgar Publishing; 2017.

“Financial Liberalization and the Onset of Financial Crisis in Western European States Between 1983 and 2011: An Econometric Investigation.” Accepted by The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 09/15

Working Papers:

Government in the Money View: Sovereign Debt, Liquidity Preference, and the Fiscal-Monetary Nexus

In times of financial crisis, we expect monetary authorities to provide liquidity support to banks at risk of failure. However, governments often provide monetary support to banks at risk of failure through guarantees and direct lending to financial institutions, often in tandem with monetary authorities. At the same time, governments may require liquidity support in moments of crisis, when cyclical deficits rise, and bond market activity constrains access to funding. This paper introduces governments’ activity into both the Post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money as well as Mehrling’s ‘Money View’ of the economy. It demonstrates how government activity becomes more important during periods of heightened liquidity preference through its support of financial institutions, while governments may simultaneously become more vulnerable to private bondholders increased liquidity preference. Some governments are likely to face greater obstacles in providing liquidity and accessing funding in times of economic uncertainty, while others may find their ability to provide liquidity is bolstered by popular perceptions of their credit worthiness. Recent experiences during the Global Financial Crisis, the Eurozone Crisis, and the COVID-19 Crisis illustrate the importance of understanding the monetary and financial factors that may constrain governments’ abilities to fund deficits, especially given the importance of fiscal expenditure as a stabilizing economic force, or as a potential driver of economic development.

“Climate Change, Balance Sheet Crises, and Distributional Inequity: Using Black Swan Lessons to Avoid Green Swan Inequities.” Co-authored with John Hogan Morris

Climate change is likely to trigger balance sheet crises as the propensity for and scope of natural crises increases in the near and medium term. This paper uses Keynesian theories to argue that governments and central banks should use expansive policies to stabilize domestic and global economies that may result from both physical and financial consequences of climate change. This paper takes lessons from the Global Financial Crisis and the Coronavirus Pandemic to suggest how governments and central banks have learned some positive lessons in how to more equitably sustain economic activity. It also highlights the global inequity of recent responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. While higher-income economies emit most global carbon emissions, and while lower-income economies are generally at higher risk of natural calamity as a result of climate change, more expansive fiscal and monetary responses to the risks of climate change will yield improvements for developed and developing economies alike. If governments and central banks proactively shift economies away from carbon-emitting activities while increasing relief efforts to help domestic and foreign non-financial interests, economic growth, social welfare, and global equity may all improve.

“Financialization, Structural Power, and the Global Financial Crisis for Europe’s Core and Periphery”

In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), European governments intervened to support domestic financial systems; several years later, peripheral European economies were at greater risk of having domestic financial crises transform into fiscal crises. This paper explores the puzzle of why banks in core European economies, which engaged in riskier activity with greater potential negative effects, faced preferential treatment in the aftermath of the GFC. Using heterodox and political economic theories, it argues that financialization reinforced the structural economic power of financial institutions, and that these powers were in turn reinforced by structural power of core members of the Eurozone to direct supranational policies. It supports these claims with financial data from balance sheets for a sample of EU economies, as well as institutional analysis of the financial aspects of European integration, and the financial, monetary, and fiscal responses that followed the onset of the GFC. While banks in the Eurozone core were more likely to have engaged in risky behavior, they were more likely to receive liquidity assistance from monetary authorities like the Federal Reserve due to their activity in the US. As Eurozone governments consider how to respond to crises such as the Covid-19 pandemic going forward, policies that more equitably support governments rescuing domestic financial actors should be considered in tandem with broader financial regulations of structurally important economic institutions.

A Political Economy of Fiscal Space: Political Structures, Bond Markets, and Monetary Accommodation of Government Spending Potential at Municipal, National, and International Levels

In times of economic crisis, academics, policy-makers, and pundits often debate how much government debt is too much. This paper argues that discourses about fiscal space should consider several political economic factors beyond the ratio of fiscal deficits and debt to GDP when determining the sustainability of any economy’s fiscal deficit. These include political constraints on both government spending and taxation, financial and monetary dynamics in bond markets for sovereign debt, and the relative hierarchy of governments attempting to issue sovereign debt. While the federal governments of the US and Germany may easily issue and sell debt in private markets, smaller economies are more vulnerable to demand fluctuations, and will benefit from explicit commitments by monetary authorities to resume their historic roles as governments’ banks, especially during crises. By highlighting present political constraints, monetary structures, and market factors that may inhibit governments’ successful placement of bonds, it deepens present debate about the potential feasibility of functional finance to facilitate fiscal activity, even in unprecedented times.

“Network Analysis of European Wealth, Elites, and Integration, Pre- and Post-Eurozone Crisis.” A network analysis of connections between the 50 largest European firms, government, quasi government institutions, and higher education, mapping change in these connections from 2000 through 2017. Particularly explores the changing shares of private versus public connections, as well as evolution after the Eurozone Crisis.

Other Publications and Media:

The Ambiguous Effects of Targeting Current Account Surpluses” — chapter in Pressman and Smithin (Eds.) The Debates in Monetary Economics, forthcoming in November, 2022

General Theories” — a review of Stephen Marglin’s Raising Keynes for Phenomenal World, June 2, 2022

Nina Eichacker on Solyndra, Socialism, and Fiscal Space” — Podcast interview for Reviving Growth Keynesianism, June 1, 2022

Pluralist Economics as a Democratizing Force: A Review Essay about The Routledge Handbook of Heterodox Economics and Democratizing the Economics Debate: Pluralism and Research Evaluation” — Review of Political Economy, May 26, 2022

Fight Inflation with Surplus, Not Scarcity” — NOEMA magazine; co-authored with Jason Oakes, May 19, 2022

“Inflation Demystified with Economist Nina Eichacker” — Shameless Money Salon, May 2022

What does it mean when the Federal Reserve Uses its Tools?” — Interview on Marketplace, March 2022

The Case for More Solyndras” – MIT Tech Review; co-authored with Mark Paul. November, 2020.

Ooh La La: Der Kapitalismus Ist Vorbei.” Jacobin.De. July 10, 2020.

The End of Capitalism: Ooh La La.” Blog Post, Progress in Political Economy. May 27, 2020.

Learning All the Wrong Lessons From the 2008 Financial Crisis.” Op-Ed; Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting. May 12, 2020.

Economic Reporting on Hardships of Pandemic Should Explore Market Failures.” Op-Ed; Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting. April 26, 2020.

Rethinking the Theory of Money, Credit, and Macroeconomics: A Review Essay,” in Review of Political Economy (2020): 1-8.

“Can America Truly Turn Socialist?” December, 2019 Challenge, 63(1), 40-51.

“Too Good to be True: What the Icelandic Crisis Revealed About Global Finance,” in The Political Economy of International Finance in an Age of Inequality: Soft Currencies, Hard Landings, edited by Gerald Epstein. November, 2018. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing

Presentations:

January 2022: American Economic Association Conference: “Monetary Power and Fiscal Expenditure in the Structuralist View of Money: Liquidity Structures, Endogenous Money, and Government Spending.”

January 2022: International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in Economics, Opening Plenary: “Heterodox Approaches to Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Space.”

September 2021: Rethinking Economics for Africa: “Structural Power and Monetary and Fiscal Space: A Preliminary Comparison of Core and Periphery”

July 2021: Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics: “Fiscal Subordination in Monetary Policy: Monetary Policy in the Core and Periphery of the Eurosystem After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.”

June 2021: George Washington University’s Institute for International Economic Policy’s “Facing Inequality” Series: Responding to “The Political Selection Effects of Campaign Finance Rules.”

February 2021: Eastern Economic Conference, “Political Economy of Fiscal Space,” and “Fiscal Expenditure in a Structuralist Approach to Endogenous Money”

July, 2020: Association for Heterodox Economics, “Liquidity, Assets, and Power in Monetary Policy for the European Core and Periphery, Before and After the Euro”

March, 2020: Boston University, Global Development Policy Workshop, “German Finance and the Eurozone Crisis”

February, 2020: Eastern Economic Association Conference — “Roundtable on James Crotty’s Keynes Against Capitalism: Socialism, Keynesianism, and Crotty for Our Times“; “Trade and the Desirability of Deficits in Post-Keynesian Economics”

January, 2020: American Economic Association Conference — “Special Drawing Rights, Target2 Balances, and European Monetary Policy, Before and After the Eurozone Crisis”

June, 2019: History of Economics Society Annual Conference; John Smithin Symposium

March, 2019: Eastern Economic Association Conference — “Too Good to Be True: What the Icelandic Crisis Revealed About Global Finance” [Union for Radical Political Economics]

January, 2019: American Economic Association Conference — “Network Analysis of European Wealth, Elites, and Integration, Pre- and Post-Eurozone Crisis.” [Association for Social Economics]

Grant Applications:

November, 2020: URI College of Arts and Sciences Dean’s Summer Faculty Research Program, 2021: “Network Analysis of European Wealth, Elites, and Integration, Pre- and Post-Eurozone Crisis”

May, 2020: SSRC — “Macro Fears — Theory vs. Practice — in Responses to Past Crises, and Lessons for the Covid-19 Pandemic”

July, 2019: Rebuilding Macroeconomics — Institutions Hub: Network Analysis of Corporate Connections to the Bank of England [Finalist]